home *** CD-ROM | disk | FTP | other *** search
- October 17, 1988CHILE Fall of the Patriarch
-
-
- Pinochet loses at the polls, but democracy is not the victor yet
-
-
- "He fell! He fell!"
-
- For 15 years General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 72, has held Chile
- in his proud and dictatorial grasp--once even boasting that
- "there is not a single leaf in this country that I do not move."
- So why shouldn't he have believed that Chileans would vote si
- last week in an extraordinary plebiscite on whether to extend
- his presidential term to 1997? But shortly before 2 a.m. on
- Thursday, an ashen-faced official stepped from La Moneda, the
- presidential palace in Santiago, and headed for a nearby
- government building. There he told TV viewers that the public
- had said no to the extension. The final tally, with 7.2 million
- votes cast: 54/7% to 43%. Despite the hour, several hundred
- jubilant demonstrators sounded car horns in the capital and
- howled delightedly, "He fell! He fell!"
-
- The vote was a turning point on Chile's long road back to a
- nearly 150-year old tradition of democracy, which was toppled
- in the 1973 coup that brought Pinochet to power. Since ousting
- the elected, but floundering, government of Marxist President
- Salvador Allende Gossens, Pinochet has led a military junta that
- routinely uses terror to enforce its will. Deep scars remain
- from a 1973-76 antileftist purge in which tens of thousands of
- Chileans were exiled, tortured or executed. Meanwhile, the
- politically explosive gulf between rich and poor has steadily
- grown wider. "We broke an authoritarian system," said Ricardo
- Lagos, president of the Party for Democracy, one of the 16
- groups that made up the Command for the No, which led the
- campaign to defeat Pinochet. "Now our work is to reconstruct
- a democratic system."
-
- The vote will not transform Chile overnight. If presidential
- elections are held as scheduled in December 1989, Pinochet, who
- has already headed the country longer than any other leader,
- would retain power at least until March 1990. He can also
- remain commander of the army until 1995. Whenever the voting
- does take place (opposition leaders have pressed for an earlier
- date), Chile's traditionally fractious parties will have to
- agree on a field that allows the winner to emerge with enough
- support to govern.
-
- For his part, Pinochet vowed not to go quietly. Wearing a
- crisp dress-white uniform, the general accepted "the verdict of
- the majority" but pledged "to complete my mandate with a
- patriotic sense." He buttressed the point by refusing to accept
- the resignation of his 16-member Cabinet, which then agreed to
- stay.
-
- Pinochet's defiance produced a bizarre pattern of dancing and
- rioting in the streets. Police fired tear gas and water cannons
- at some antigovernment protesters in two days of clashes that
- left dozens wounded and two people dead. More than 20 foreign
- journalists were among the injured. On Friday hundreds of
- thousands of Chileans celebrated the no vote with a joyous rally
- in Santiago. Singing and swaying to music by popular groups,
- they called on Pinochet to step down.
-
- The dictator hardly expected to lose the plebiscite when, in
- 1980, he pushed through a constitution that mandated the vote.
- Eager to gain democratic legitimacy, Pinochet expected a
- booming economy to buoy his popularity throughout the decade.
- But a 1982 crash ended that hope, and the subsequent recovery
- benefited wealthy landowners, bankers and multinational
- companies, while Chile's slums sank deeper into squalor. By the
- start of 1988, the failure of the country's growing riches to
- spread to the middle and lower classes had festered into a key
- campaign issue. The divide had a further impact: it
- strengthened such radical factions as the Manuel Rodriguez
- Patriotic Front, a Communist splinter group that killed five of
- Pinochet's bodyguards in a 1986 assassination attempt. The army
- replied with a wave of reprisals that further alienated many
- Chileans.
-
- With the plebiscite approaching, Pinochet lifted a 15-year state
- of emergency in August and allowed 500 exiles to return to the
- country. They found a more subtle form of repression. Instead
- of censoring the press, for example, the regime responded to
- articles it did not like by jailing reporters and publishers.
- While labor unions are now permitted, leaders who call for
- industry-wide strikes risk banishment. Last February a U.S.
- human-rights report noted at least 100 cases of torture in 1987
- by Chilean security forces.
-
- Pinochet also miscalculated the resolve of Chile's opposition
- parties. Though it had barely seemed possible, long-squabbling
- groups ranging from the right-wing National Party to the
- leftist Almeyda Socialists flocked together under the
- anti-Pinochet banner. They took the lead in registering an
- astounding 92% of Chile's eligible voters, though critics
- cautioned that some government sympathizers might have signed
- under different names to swell the si tally. Meanwhile, the no
- forces used newly granted access to TV studios to launch tuneful
- and compelling spots. The regime, by contrast, relied on stolid
- footage of factories and roads or warnings of a return to the
- chaos and violence of the Allende years.
-
- Though he lagged in most of the polls, Pinochet still expected
- victory. But his eleventh-hour emergence as a baby kisser in
- civilian dress could not improve his chances. Nor could
- numerology sway the final outcome: deeply superstitious,
- Pinochet held the plebiscite on Oct. 5 apparently because five
- is his lucky number.
-
- Within the government the vote immediately shifted the balance
- of power away from Pinochet. "I think the armed forces will
- treat Pinochet delicately for the moment," said a Western
- diplomat in Santiago. "They might gently insist on a more
- collegial relationship within the junta." But the military too
- was wounded by the vote. Known as "the last Prussian army" for
- its aloofness from the rest of society, the army considers the
- fall of its leader to be a personal defeat. That could make the
- armed forces sullen and defensive in coming months.
-
- The opposition is clearly taking no chances on offending the
- army and triggering a possible coup. During the campaign,
- political leaders agreed to withdraw TV spots that showed
- carabinero security forces beating citizens. In return, police
- provided protection for opposition rallies and marches. Yet
- such fragile alliances could easily be shattered by embarrassing
- demands. For example, most opposition groups want to prosecute
- the military for human-rights violations. But moderate parties
- are willing to overlook old abuses in exchange for assurances
- that new ones will not occur.
-
- Pinochet nevertheless emerged from last week's ballot in a
- relatively strong position. By winning 43% of the vote, he
- showed broader popular appeal than opposition polls had
- indicated--a considerable achievement for a dictator after 15
- years in power. Said Labor Minister Alfonso Marquez de la
- Plata: "The plebiscite was a personal triumph for the President
- and an electoral defeat for his collaborators. It's a clear
- demonstration that he enjoys a great deal of civilian support."
-
- Perhaps. For now, the key issue remains the timing of
- presidential elections. A quick ballot could even help the
- government by allowing it to support a single candidate before
- the opposition can produce a strong field. A long delay, on the
- other hand, could unravel the opposition's recent unity. But
- such concerns seemed remote to exultant Chileans last week. In
- the fall of a ruthless patriarch, the country caught a happy
- glimpse of both its democratic past and its possible future.
-
- --By John Greenwald. Reported by Laura Lopez/Santiago
-
-
- --------------------------------------------------------- How
- Much Did the U.S. Help?
-
- The CIA helped put Augusto Pinochet Ugarte into power by playing
- a pivotal role in the 1973 military coup that toppled the
- country's democratically elected Marxist government. So it
- seems only fitting that the U.S. used its leverage to help
- topple Pinochet at the ballot box. The Reagan Administration
- initially downplayed Pinochet's human-rights violations in hopes
- of persuading the junta to ease repression. The arrival of U.S.
- Ambassador Harry Barnes in 1985 signaled a change in tactics:
- Barnes repeatedly called for a return to democracy and
- instructed the embassy to monitor all human-rights violations.
-
- Meanwhile, Washington sponsored a U.N. Human Rights Commission
- denunciation of Chile in 1986. The Administration also funneled
- more than $1 million to opposition groups to register plebiscite
- voters. Four days before the vote, Washington learned that the
- junta might delay the ballot. U.S. officials warned Chilean
- authorities against the plan, going so far as to summon Chile's
- Ambassador to the U.S. to an unusual Sunday-morning meeting.
- Said a U.S. diplomat: "Our message was that if they went ahead
- with the operation to postpone the election, we would publicly
- reveal in detail what we knew."
-
-
- --------------------------------------------------------- WHAT
- HAPPENS NEXT
-
- PRESIDENCY:
-
- The constitution keeps Pinochet in power until elections in
- December 1989. The opposition wants to speed up the vote.
-
- LEGISLATURE:
-
- Elected at the same time. Pinochet will keep a seat; the
- government can name ten out of 36 Senators. The opposition
- wants all seats elected.
-
- MILITARY:
-
- Pinochet still in command. The opposition wants him out,
- civilian control thereafter.
-
-